A recent review of public sector pay and employment -shows that countries with an excessive public wage bill have a surplus of civil servants (Nunberg 1987) . Nonetheless, reduction of the public labor force is not frequently undertaken. Though freezing recruitment or preventing guaranteed hiring of, say, university graduates may be possible, in many countries the dismissal of civil servants is considered politically infeasible.
Explicit wage reductions or freezes are equally unpalatable. Hence, it is not surprising to find that wage cuts have been disguised, and perhaps most commonly undertaken through inflationary erosion. In a recent sample of African countries, for example, growth in real starting salaries was almost uniformly negative for the period 1975-83 (Lindauer and others 1988) . Annual reductions of more than 10 percent were the rule, and in some cases they exceeded 30 percent.
In sum, the general policy has been to maintain public employment while reducing real wages. Whether or not this is the best policy depends heavily on the answer to a deceptively straightforward question: are government wages too high? In most cases, the most relevant yardstick for answering this question is the wage level in the private sector.
The answer to this question has implications not only for the size of the budget. Government wage policies have a significant imnpact on the entire economy. If public wages are too high, they exert upward pressures on wages in the private sector, with obvious employment and efficiency implications. If they are too low, they will lead to a discouraged public work force and moonlighting (double jobbing) activities (see Mazumdar 1987) .
For developing countries, there are few empirical studies that deal with the issue of public sector-private sector wage comparisons in a systematic manner. Making a comparison on the basis of average wages is misleading since no adjustment is made for differences in education levels and work experience of workers in the two sectors. Many studies use standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques to control for wage-determining attributes (for example, education and experience) in assessing the public-private wage differential. There are numerous such studies for the industrial world, especially for Canada and the United States (for studies on Canada, see Abbot and Stanos 1986 , Gunderson 1979a , 1979b , 1979c , Robinson and Tomes 1984 , and Shapiro and Stelcner 1980 , 1986  for surveys of American studies, see Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986 and Wise 1987) . A search of the literature revealed but a handful of studies which address this issue empirically in the developing world. More serious than the lack of research is a methodological flaw in these studies that casts doubts on some of the findings.
In this article we compare public and private sector wages for two developing countries, C6te d'Ivoire and Peru, using data from the 1985 C6te d'lvoire Living Standards Survey (CILSS), and the 1985-86 Peru Living Standards Survey (PLSS) . In section 1, we briefly review the literature on pub:lic-private pay differentials in developing countries and indicate why the available studies may have produced misleading results. We formalize this argument in section II, develop the model used in this study, and present our estimation results, showing that at the time of the data surveys, public wages were well below those in the private sector.
What are the effects of this pay gap on the quality and motivation of government workers and on the private sector? One hypothesis is that the wage gap provokes moonlighting activities (double jobbing), a phenomenon that is known to be widespread among civil servants in developing countries. Our results, discussed in section III, link lower public wages to a greater incidence of moonlighting and therefore provide additional support for the conclusion that public wages are below those in the private sector. In section IV we summarize and discuss our results and draw conclusions for public employment and wage policies, as well as for future research.
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A perusal of the literature on wage comparisons between the public and private sectors in developing countries reveals that there are two general types of studies, one which compares some group averages, the other, based on human capital models, which assesses variation based on individual characteristics.
The former approach compares averages between the two groups of workers, either on an aggregate basis or stratified by qualification levels (such as education) or by job characteristics (occupation). Examples are the studies by Bennell (1983) , Heller and Tait (1984) , and Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng (1988) , and the numerous country economic memorandums of the World Bank (listed in Nunberg 1987) . Although these descriptive analyses do shed light on the policy issues at stake, comparisons of average wages do not systematically analyze the role of worker background characteristics in determining relative levels of remuneration.
The conceptual framework of the second group of studies is the human capital model of earnings determination developed by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1958 Mincer ( , 1974 . This model postulates that observed wage differences among individuals arise from a mix of school and postschool investments (education, training, work experience) as well as other socioeconomic factors, such as marital status, geographical location, and nationality, thought to be correlated with earnings.
These studies typically estimate sector-specific wage equations which allow one to test statistically for the equality of overall pay structures in the two sectors and also to gauge the sectoral differences in the "rates of return" of a specific background attribute, for example, a year of schooling or a diploma. The estimated wage functions can further be used to decompose the observed wage gap into two components: one that comes from differences in endowments of wage-determining attributes (the explanatory variables), and a second that arises from differences between the sectors in the estimated "rewards" or "returns" to these attributes (the regression coefficients). The second component cannot be ascribed to productivity-enhancing background attributes and is to be regarded as a priori evidence that one or the other group of workers enjoys a pay premium.
There are four other common strands among the studies. First, all studies use cross-section data. Second, they find that the observed average wage of government workers exceeds that of private workers. Third, each study uses some variant of the Mincerian earnings function. Fourth, they employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique. In general, the studies find that the wage determination process differs (statistically) in the two sectors, but there is a lack of consensus about the existence of economic rents and which group of workers receives them. In the studies we reviewed (table 1) there is much variation in both the direction and magnitudes of the estimated wage advantage.
Several authors find that government employees enjoy a significant wage advantage. In their study on Tanzania, Lindauer and Sabot (1983) report that both civil servants and parastatal (state enterprise) employees enjoy a premium vis-a-vis private sector workers. The former receive a modest 14 percent surplus, while the latter earned about 30 percent more than private sector workers. House (1984) decomposed the public-private wage gap for different levels of work experience and education, for both male and female workers in Cyprus. He reports a pure earnings advantage for both men and women in the public sector, but that for women is much larger than for men. For women, the estimated surplus ranges from 5 to 109 percent. The rents are less, but still substantial, for male government employees, ranging from 5 to 46 percent. House finds a negative pay differential (of 5 percent) in the public sector only for male workers with vocational training and two to five years of work experience.
Conversely, for Chile, Corbo and Stelcner (1983) find that private workers receive a modest wage premium of 5 percent, which rises to 20 percent if Minimum Employment Program workers are included. For the majority of studies, however, the results are mixed or inconclusive. For Colombia, Mohan (1986) finds that there is no statistical difference in the wage structures between the public and private sector. Mazumdar (1981) , in his study on Malaysia, concludes that the returns to primary schooling are lower and those to postprimary schooling are higher for workers in the public sector. The study by Komenan (1987) on C6te d'Ivoire for 1984, on the one hand, finds that, with the exception of university education, the returns to schooling are higher for civil servants than for private workers, while returns to work experience are higher in the private sector. On the other hand, the results for Colombia reported by Psacharopoulos, Arriagada, and Velez (1987) show higher returns to education and lower returns to experience in the private sector. The survey by Psacharopoulos (1983) on Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Malaysia, and Portu-gal reports that, in all except Greece, returns to both education and experience are higher in the private sector than in the public sector. While highly educated workers in the government sector do not have a wage advantage, however, less educated public workers may receive a wage premium. Steier (1987) reports that, in Venezuela in 1975, average public wages were higher than private wages at all educational levels except postsecondary (about the same), but that by 1984, public wages were lower at all schooling levels. Moreover, while in 1975 the returns to schooling and experience were higher for private workers, by 1984 these were about the same in the two sectors. Also, in 1975 government workers had a 17.5 percent wage advantage which disappeared by 1984. This, Steier suggests, was possibly due to a selective wage freeze imposed on government workers.
All these studies tested for the equality of the wage structure in the two sectors after estimating the wage equation using OLS. The validity of this approach depends crucially on the implicit assumption that employees are randomly distributed (with respect to their unobservable wage-determining characteristics) between the two sectors. But they may not be, especially when wage differentials exist. In that case, potential employees will queue for the "preferred" sector, and a selection process will determine who will obtain employment in that sector. Sometimes this selection process is very explicit, for instance, when high school or university graduates are guaranteed employment in the public sector. Usually, however, the selection process will be the result of the interplay between the preferences of the employees and the employers. In any case, the process will lead to two samples of workers (public and private) which, by design, are selected, not randomized. Thus the selection process may lead to biases in the estimates of the parameters of interest, depending on whether the characteristics that have an impact on both the wage level and the selection process are in any way correlated. If so, the OLS results will be biased, and, consequently, derived sectoral wage comparisons will be misleading.
II. THE MODEL AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
To formalize the argument concerning sectoral wage comparisons obtained using OLS, we develop a model that tests for the existence of selectivity bias. We estimate this model for C6te d'Ivoire and Peru using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods, compare the results with OLS estimates, and answer the main question of interest: are wages in the public sector higher or lower than those in the private sector?
A Switching Regression Model for Public-Private Wage Comparisons
The switching regression model consists of two wage equations, one selection equation and an assumption about the statistical distribution of the three disturbance terms in the model (for the derivation of the structure of the model, see also Maddala 1983, p. 261 Let us denote the public and private sectors as sector 1 and 2 respectively, and express the corresponding wage functions as:
In w 2 = Xf2 + u 2 where In wi is the natural log of wages in section i, f3 is the vector of coefficients associated with wage-determining attributes X, and ui is a disturbance term. The process that leads to the selection of an individual into one of the sectors has two steps. First, an individual will determine whether or not to try to obtain a public job. For the sake of exposition, we assume that public jobs are the preferred ones; the argument is symmetrical. Second, he or she may or may not be chosen for the job. Because there are costs (deferred wages) to applying for a job, the prospective employee compares the expected benefits with the likelihood of not being chosen. We assume, for the time being, that the benefits are equal (or proportional) to the difference in the (log) wage rates between the two sectors. The cost, that is, the likelihood of not being selected, is assumed to be determined by a set of employee characteristics (a vector ZJ).
Thus an employee will be in the public sector if the benefits exceed the cost, that is, if
where E, is a random disturbance term to be discussed below. If we combine the wage determinants X (from equations 1 and 2) with the variables in Z, to obtain the vector Z, we can summarize the selection process as follows:
where P' represents the (unobserved) probability of being in the public sector and e is a random disturbance term that combines the effect of ul, u 2 , and El. Note that this single equation summarizes a two-step' process. First, the expected wage differential must be large enough to make it worthwhile for the individual to try to obtain a public job. The decision to apply is determined by the expected wage differential, the cost of applying, and variables related to preferences for a public job. Second, the employer determines whether the person is chosen for the job depending upon the person's attributes in the eyes of the employer. The outcome of the two levels of choices is one group of public workers (I* -0), who apply and receive an offer of a public job, and another group of private workers (J* < 0), who either do not apply or apply but do not receive a public wage offer.
In principle, one could model the applicant and employer choices with two selection equations (Poirier 1980; Abowd and Farber 1982; Hendricks and Kahn 1984) . But since the expected wage differential is unknown, and must be estimated in a study such as this, the distinction between the first-and secondchoice equations lies mainly in the variable measuring the cost to the worker of applying. The data sets used for this study do not contain any information on such costs, so that it is not possible to adequately identify the two stages of the selection process separately. (Hendricks and Kahn 1984 , using a binary probit model, find a correlation between the error terms of the two selection equations of 0.9998, implying that the data were essentially unable to separate the two equations.) Hence the factors affecting the choice of both the individual and the employer are combined in Z and e and the linear specification in equation 5 approximates the nonlinear relation implied by a model with two selection equations.' To the extent that by this the model is misspecified, the parameter estimates are biased.
There are three more issues that, if properly taken into account, may lead to further complications of the model. First, sectoral differences in nonpecuniary benefits of employment may exist. When nonpecuniary benefits are a fraction, p, of total compensation, E, the selection equation remains the same. We then
, and equation 3 can be expressed in either E, or w,. When nonpecuniary benefits are not proportional to the wage, the differential in proportions enters the selection equation directly, and ln w,-
The differential appears in the intercept in Z,<y 1 if the proportions are constant. If they are not constant, the differential is among the explanatory variables in Z, to the extent that these capture wageseekers' responses to the divergence in nonpecuniary benefits between the sectors.
Second, public sector workers are more frequently observed to hold a second job. In this article we take the simple view that the relatively high incidence of moonlighting may, at least in part, be induced by the public-private wage differential: public workers may be forced to engage in other work after hours to increase total income. We test this hypothesis in section IV. In a more structural approach to the sector choice problem one may want to include the probability of finding a second job as a determinant of the preference for, say, public employment, the assumption being that required hours of work and regulations on absenteeism in the public sector facilitate moonlighting. Since the focus of this study is on public-private wage differentials, we postpone extension of the model in this direction for future work.
Third, the sectoral decision may well be a lifetime choice based on expected average long-run returns. Thus people may choose to work in a sector despite 1. While it is beyond the scope of this article, applicants have also made the decision to participate in the "formal" labor force, as a private or public employee, as opposed to not working or being selfemployed. Thus the applicant pool is already self-selected, and parameter estimates may be affected by this.
short-run wage shortfalls. A short-run business cycle may hurt these workers, but expected future gains may offset current losses. This is a source of error, captured by the disturbance term e, in the selector equation 3, and thus also by e in equation 5.
In summary, the selection process will refect supply and demand factors. The difference in wage offers will matter, at least to the worker, and consequently all variables included in the vector X which determine wage levels are potentially relevant. Furthermore, the applicant's personal characteristics will matter, at least to the employer, and many of these are also included in the vector X. Hence, the vector X will enter the selection equation, but the associated vector of coefficients will not necessarily be proportional to (j, -102). Characteristics other than those contained in X may also be relevant. The vector Z combines factors that are relevant to the prospective employee in determining whether to apply for the job (including nonpecuniary benefits and prospects of moonlighting) and to the employer in deciding which worker to choose.
Turning to the estimation issues, the switching regression model of equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 contains three random disturbances, namely u,, u 2 , and e. We shall assume that (u 1 , u 2 , e) follows a trivariate normal distribution with nonzero covariances.
It has been shown (for example , Olsen 1980 ) that the estimates of models of the type used here are sensitive to the distributional assumption. Such sensitivity is reduced if the vector Z includes variables that theory indicates would affect the selection process but which are not determinants of wage rates. In the absence of such variables, the functional form of the distribution of the random disturbances can provide identification of the model (that is, allow one to estimate all parameters), but functional form is generally regarded as a weak and therefore unsatisfactory basis for identification. In the empirical analysis below, the wage determinants, X, overlap with the selection variables, Z, almost entirely, so caution in interpretation applies. Experimentation with inclusion of different variables in the vector Z, however, left the parameter estimates largely unchanged, supporting the validity of the estimates as derived.
To see why OLS estimation is a flawed technique in models where selection occurs, one must recognize that equations 1 and 2 represent the unconditional wages in the two sectors (that is, the wage offers). In response to these, workers end up in one or the other sector, as given by the selection equation, so that the sample of workers in any one sector represents conditional or accepted wages, that is, wage rates conditional upon being selected into that sector. In using OLS, the selection decision reflected in equation 5 does not enter the wage estimates. In fact, the OLS technique implicitly assumes that equation 5 is uncorrelated with equations 1 and 2. It is quite possible, though, that some correlation does exist, since preference or taste variables and unmeasured productivity-enhancing traits may influence both the selection process and the wage. For example, a preference for risk taking and entrepreneurship may make it more likely that an individual chooses a career in the private sector. Such an individual may also be more successful (have a higher wage) than the average private employee. Similarly, for public employees, nepotism or "connections" may increase both the chances of obtaining a public job and the wage received. We can readily test for the correlation between the disturbance terms of the wage equations on the one hand and the disturbance term of the switching equation on the other by estimating the model with maximum likelihood techniques. (See the appendix for specification of the FIML and OLS estimations).
Data and Estimation Results
We estimate the model developed above for Cote d'lvoire and Peru. Both countries face severe budgetary constraints, have targeted the government wage bill for budget reduction, and show the typical pattern of wage erosion for public employees, although the change in real wages is much more dramatic for Peru. The important observation, as shown in table 2, is that public wages have decreased significantly relative to real wages in the private sector for both countries (see Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 1986; Cote d 'Ivoire 1982; and Komenan 1987) .
The C6te d'lvoire Living Standards Survey (CILSS) and the Peru Living Standards Survey (PLSS) contain virtually identical information, which is the basis for this study (see Ainsworth and Mufioz 1986; Grootaert and Arriagada 1986; and Stelcner, Arriagada, and Moock 1987) . The remuneration measure used for both countries, which we term "the wage," comprises cash and the value of in-kind benefits, such as food, housing, and transportation allowances.
The CILSS collects information on 1,600 households per year, nationwide. The wage sector is relatively small in C6te d'Ivoire, as compared with agriculture and self-employment (see, for instance, Newman 1987). Therefore, the CILSS contains information on only 513 individuals who report a wage earning activity (with positive earnings) as their main job during the seven days before the interview. Our analysis is based on this sample of wage earners.
The PLSS, conducted between June 1985 and July 1986, contains detailed socioeconomic information on 5,000 households nationwide. The analysis for Peru is confined to a sample of 1,013 urban male wage earners in Lima, who were over fourteen years of age and who reported positive earnings during the week before the interview. Table 3 presents the definitions and summary statistics of all variables used Furthermore, the concentration of schooling diplomas is much higher in the public sector. There are no non-Ivorians in the public sector, and 26 percent of the government labor force is female versus only 15 percent in the private sector. Total experience, measured as age minus formal schooling minus technical training minus 5, averages about 20 years in both sectors. But occupationspecific experience is much lower in the private than in the public sector, showing the importance of job tenure in the latter and of job mobility in the former. Note that, with an average age of 32 years, 20 years of experience 2. Note that in the Lima sample, all potential experience accumulated since leaving school, including job-specific experience, is aggregated in one variable, overlapping with the "'job-specific" measure. The C6te d'lvoire sample, however, measures experience prior to entering the current occupation as one variable, with no overlap with the occupation-specific measure. makes very young entry into the private sector possible. Most striking is the difference in the average wage rates: public employees earn on average almost twice as much as private wage earners. Table 4 presents definitions and summary statistics for the study on Lima. As in Cote d'lvoire, public workers show on average a higher level of education, though the difference is less than two years. However, while 22 percent of public workers have a university diploma, only 8 percent of private employees have one. Public workers are slightly older and more likely to be married. Again, on average, public wages exceed those in the private sector.
The two samples were used to estimate the complete model, equations 1, 2, and 4, using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) (see van der Gaag and Vijverberg 1988). We also estimated equations 1 and 2 separately with OLS. The FIML and OLS estimates of the log wage equations are shown in tables 5 and 6, using the best specification of the model. While the model was first estimated allowing all elements of the fl and 0, vectors to vary, x 2 tests showed that the coefficients of the experience, diploma, and parental education varia- Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis; p,, is the correlation between u, and e.
Source: van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988). bles were not significantly different between the sectors. Subsequently, the model was reestimated restricting the effects of these variables to be the same in both sectors. The corresponding sector choice equations are presented in table 7. Detailed discussions of the results can be found in van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) for C6te d'Ivoire and in Stelcner, van der Gaag, and Vijverberg (1987) for Peru. For our purpose here, these results are best summarized in experience-wage profiles, which show the expected wage for an average worker (where characteristics are averaged over both sectors) over the worklife.
Experience-wage profiles for an average employee are shown in figures 1 and 2 for C6te d'lvoire and Peru, respectively, to compare the results of OLS and FIML estimates. Starting from age 18, we let occupational experience and, in the case of Lima, general experience grow yearly until age 55. Perhaps the most striking result is the large deviation between the two types of estimates. Selectivity bias in the OLS estimates appears to be very serious. The OLS results show that starting salaries in the private sector are well below those in the public sector, but the experience profiles are steeper for private employees. For Peru, private wages eventually will exceed those in the public sector, but in C6te d'lvoire public wages are always higher than private wages through fifty-five years of age. The conclusion based on the FIML estimates is quite different: for workers with average characteristics, public wage offers are lower than private wage offers throughout the working lifetime. This conclusion holds for both countries. Table 8 shows the differences in sectoral reward to worker characteristics as reflected in the wages offered and paid for an average worker with values for the characteristics again averaged across sectors. Wage offers from the private sector exceed those of the public sector by 36 percent in C6te d'Ivoire (1985) Figure 1 . and by 97 percent in Peru (1985-86) . That does not mean that every average worker would reject a public job offer: variation in unobserved productive characteristics will still make public employment a preferred choice for some, otherwise average, workers.
In C6te d'Ivoire, when the average worker applies to the private sector, the wage offer is CFAF 415. For the average worker who accepts the offer, however, the wage is CFAF 699; the unobserved productive characteristics which determine selection in that sector are worth CFAF 284. The wage in the public sector rejected by such workers is CFAF 180, a difference of CFAF 520. The difference between the accepted wage in the public sector and that offered in the private sector is much smaller: the wage gap equals CFAF 385 on a wage of CFAF 600.
In Peru, those who accept a public job received an average wage offer of 8.25 intis (I/). Their unobserved productive characteristics are worth 1/5.03, that is, the selectivity effect. Such workers rejected job offers with an average wage of 1/6.34 from the private sector, a difference of 1/1.91. Statistically, this difference is insignificant. In comparison, the difference accruing to an average private worker equals 1/3.97 on an average wage of 1/6.43.
The bottom part of table 8 shows the statistical significance of the wage difference of every worker in each sector.
3 In C6te d'Ivoire, every worker is better off in the sector where he or she is found to be. In Peru, all private workers enjoy a significant positive difference, but none of the public workers does so. In fact, one-third of the public workers appear to reject an (insignificantly) higher private sector wage.
The conclusion is the following. In Cote d'Ivoire in 1985, public wage offers were below private wage offers. Through selection among the two sectors, workers sorted themselves into the sector where they were able to enjoy the highest wage. This is consistent with the assumption that workers are heterogeneous and will function better in some environments than in others.
There is also evidence that Peruvian workers sorted themselves according to their comparative advantage. However, public wage offers to workers who accept them were so low that there was no monetary benefit for the worker to this selection at that time. Subsequent labor unrest among civil servants, and the 50 percent increase in public wages in 1987 provide additional evidence of this negative wage gap (Bonner 1988) .
If they suffer from wage discrimination, why do workers continue to seek employment in and remain in the public sector? One reason may be that nonmonetary remuneration is greater for civil servants. While our comparisons include the monetary value of such benefits as housing and travel allowances and of food received at work, the value of other fringe benefits, such as paid holidays or pensions, is not included. As is well known and shown in table 9, the percentage of workers who receive these benefits is greater for the public than the private sector.
Intangibles, such as pressure on the job, type of work, or job security also are not measured. However, in C6te d'lvoire 55 percent of public workers have a signed contract, as compared with 33 percent of employees in the private sector. Having a contract may be a proxy for job security. If this is important to the employee he or she may be willing to forgo some salary to obtain security or tenure. Other benefits, such as retirement payments or social security, may have a large monetary value that needs to be taken into account in a more comprehensive study of public and private remuneration systems (for a discussion of the economics of nonwage labor costs, see Hart 1984) .
Another explanation may be that public employees are able to retain the nonmonetary benefits of government employment while offsetting the lower wage with outside income. While this might be optimal individually, the implications for time and effort spent on the primary job are negative and would become increasingly so as the wage gap (and thus moonlighting) increased. Sources: Calculations based on data from ONFP, C6te d'lvoire, and the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Peru.
IV. MOONLIGHTING
If the FIML results are correct and public wages are too low, we might expect that civil servants would be more likely than private workers to take second jobs ("moonlight") to compensate for the wage gap. Our evidence supports this hypothesis: as shown in table 10, moonlighting is much more prevalent among civil servants than among private wage earners. For Lima, 26.7 percent of public employees have secondary jobs, versus 14.3 percent of private employees. In C6te d'Ivoire, the phenomenon seems less prevalent, and the proportions are 9.9 and 4.6 percent, respectively. The results in table 10 should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates, however. While work on a second job can take place after regular work hours or during the weekend, casual observations on absenteeism among civil servants in developing countries suggest that some of it takes place during the day. Thus respondents to the survey may have been reluctant to reveal moonlighting activities. Table 11 compares characteristics of civil servants with and without a second job. In terms of age and education the differences between the two groups of employees are fairly small. For Peru we find that those with a second job are more likely to have taken vocational training. Women are less likely to have a second job in Cote d'Ivoire. Hourly wages (of the primary, public job) are somewhat higher for moonlighters in Cote d'Ivoire but show little difference between the two groups in Lima. Moonlighters report slightly fewer hours of work in the primary job than those without a second job. Average hours on the second job are 9.7 in C6te d'Ivoire and 13.3 in Lima. Not surprisingly, most of those with second jobs are self-employed.
An important assumption in the literature on the econoimics of moonlighting is that individuals make their labor supply decisions sequentially (see Brown 1983; Joll and others 1983; and Shishko and Rostker 19276) . First, they try to obtain a public job; then, given the income earned in this job and the opportunities offered in the private sector, they decide whether or not to take a second job. This is a very reasonable assumption, although there are numerous sequences depending upon relative wages in the main and second jobs, unobserved tastes for the two jobs, and, perhaps most important, constraints on the choice of hours in the two jobs. Under an alternative scenario, workers choose the public sector knowing that they have better opportunities in that sector for second jobbing. As argued, the switching regression model may not be affected by that, but it would make some of the explanatory variables used here endogenous, and thus it would bias the estimation results reported below.
The simplest model to test for the effect of wages in the public and private sectors is given in columns 1 and 4 of table 12 for Cote d'lvoire and Peru, respectively. The table shows the estimation results of the probit equations in which the dependent variable equals one if the person has a second job, and zero otherwise. We expect, a priori, that a higher public wage will reduce the probability of moonlighting by civil servants, while a higher private wage offer will make moonlighting activities more attractive. Note that the public wage is the predicted accepted wage received by the civil servant, as compared with the private wage offer to public employees as predicted by our FIML estimates. 4 The private wage offer is used as a proxy for earnings potential in the private sector, since, as shown in table 11, moonlighters are usually self-employed (in the informal sector) rather than wage earners (in the formal sector). The implicit assumption is that the returns to labor in the informal sector are adequately reflected by wages in the formal sector. We include per capita household consumption as a prdxy for the need to earn extra income from a second job. The estimation results generally confirm our expectations. All coefficients on household consumption and on the wage variables have the expected signs, and the wage effects are significant in Peru. The results for C6te d'Ivoire lack statistical significance, which is probably due to the fact that only 10 percent of government workers reported having a second job.
A potential problem with the specification of this simple model is the obvious correlation between consumption and income earned from both the main and second jobs. In an attempt to deal with this, we replaced the per capita consumption variable with total income from the primary job. The latter is calculated as the public wage times hours worked in the main job.
In terms of the standard labor-supply literature, the coefficient on primary job income reflects the unearned income effect, while that on the private sector wage yields the wage effect, as shown in columns 2 and 5 of table 12. In columns 3 and 6, we push this approach one step further by including a proxy variable for household income earned by other members of the family, "other income" calculated as total household consumption minus the wage income of the public employee. Finally, we add several variables such as household size, age, experience, and education to see whether these characteristics have an additional direct effect on the probability of moonlighting (other than through their effect on wages).
Again, the estimation results generally confirm our expectations. Most important, if public earnings rise, the probability of moonlighting decreases. If the private wage offer increases so does the likelihood of having a secondary job. The effect of the variable representing "other" income is negligible in C6te d'Ivoire and in Lima it is small, but statistically significant (at the 7 percent level), and has the wrong sign. This is probably due to reversed causation: to satisfy the income needs of the household, other household members also pitch in and generate a higher "other" income. Thus, the work effort of others may be positively correlated with the moonlighting effort of the public worker. Most of the socioeconomic background variables seem to affect the moonlighting decision only through their impact on the wage rates. Female employees in C6te d'lvoire, however, are less likely to hold a second job, all other things being equal. While the moonlighting behavior of female workers may well be different from that of males, the sample is too small to warrant a separate analysis.
This analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that the public-private wage gap is partly responsible for the moonlighting activities of government workers. Since government workers are much more likely to have a secondary job than wage earners in the private sector, this result is consistent with our main finding of section II: wages in the private sector exceed those in the public sector for the average worker.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Before summarizing the results of the previous sections a few remarks are in order. First, though we argue that it is necessary to make the sector choice endogenous when comparing public and private wages, it has been shown that the estimates of the resulting switching regression model are sensitive to the distributional assumptions. Our estimates are based on the assumption of joint normality of the disturbance terms. Tests for normality have been proposed for simpler models (for example, Newey 1987) but we are not aware of any available tests for the more elaborate model employed here.
Second, a closer examination of the actual selection process is desirable. Our estimates show strong selectivity that is not being captured by such observable variables as education and experience. The switching equation is basically a reduced form that allows for the correction of selectivity bias but does not cast sufficient light on the actual two stages of choice by prospective employees and employers. Further analysis of these choices may bring to light various measures necessary to bring public wage and employment policies in line with those in the private sector. Such analysis will also facilitate the identification of the model which now depends on the distributional assumptions and the inclusion of a limited number of additional variables in the switching equation. To the extent that the single selection equation misspecifies the actual interplay between prospective employers and employees, the parameter estimates will still be biased, despite the fact that this model (unlike studies based on OLS regression analysis) recognizes the endogenous nature of sectoral choice.
In spite of these caveats, our estimation results yield two strong conclusions. The first is of methodological importance: conventional OLS estimates on selective samples of public and private employees may yield seriously biased estimates of the expected wage offers in both sectors. In the examples shown above, the OLS estimates actually lead to the wrong conclusion. Given the widespread use of OLS techniques in the literature on the public-private wage issue, especially in developing countries, our results issue a strong warning against the interpretation of these previous findings.
Our second result is the answer to the main question of interest: in both Cote d'Ivoire and Peru wage offers in the public sector are well below those in the private sector. Our results include all monetary remuneration, including housing and travel allowances, food at work, and other fringe benefits. They do not account for paid holidays, pensions, or intangibles such as job security, for which a worker may be willing to forgo some wages.
If such benefits are taken into account there is evidence to suggest that our basic result, that public wage offers are well below those in the private sector, will not be significantly altered. This evidence includes the time series data on public wage erosion vis-a-vis the private sector and the higher prevalence of moonlighting among public employees. Though we did not present a structural analysis of the moonlighting phenomena, the results clearly show that the public-private wage differential is an important determinant of moonlighting. A further erosion of public wages can be expected to result in more double jobbing by civil servants.
If public wages are indeed too low, why do civil servants not quit their government jobs? There are several reasons. One is that full-time wage jobs in the private sector are not available. This explanation, however, implies severe wage stickiness in the private sector, an assumption that runs counter to recent evidence on this issue for C6te d'Ivoire (see Levy and Newman 1989) . A second explanation is that some people are willing to forgo direct monetary rewards for job security, other intangible job characteristics, and fringe benefits such as paid holidays, sick leave, and social security (Hart 1984) . This view is consistent with our data on nonwage benefits in public and private jobs, though we do note that for Peru the prevalence of social security (an important fringe benefit) is about the same in both sectors.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that government workers can have their cake and eat it too. That is, they can enjoy the security and other benefits of having a government job and at the same time supplement their income by having a second job. As we have shown, the probability of finding a civil servant who has a second job in the private sector depends significantly on the public-private wage differential for this employee.
Fiscal constraints will continue to exert pressure on the government wage bill. In all likelihood, these pressures will intensify, and, given past experience, will result in further erosion of the public wage levels rather than in a reduction of public employment. At least for the two countries we studied, this has led to a situation in which public wage offers are well belowv those in the private sector.
The consequences of having underpaid government workers for internal efficiency in the government and the concomitant effects on the economy as a whole are particularly serious. The ongoing economic crisis in which many countries find themselves calls for better educated and highly motivated civil servants to promote productivity and to provide advice in the design and implementation of policies that would ameliorate an economic situation that showed significant deterioration in the recent past. Onie cannot reasonably expect to find these characteristics in a work force that is badly underpaid. The diagnosis is clear: fiscal constraints call for a reduction of the public wage bill. Two prescriptions are available, wage reduction or public employment reduction. All evidence suggests that the time has come to prescribe the latter, acknowledging that of the two, it is likely to be the more bitter medicine.
